Sweden 4-4-1-1 (Lindahl – Glas, Fischer, Sembrandt, Eriksson – Jakobsson, Rubensson, Seger, Rolfo – Asllani – Blackstenius)

Canada 4-2-3-1 (Labbe – Lawrence, Buchanan, Zadorsky, Chapman – Scott, Schmidt – Prince, Fleming, Beckie – Sinclair)

Canada and Sweden lined up in similar ways, though their pressing approaches were markedly different. Canada pressed in a 4-2-3-1 with Sinclair splitting the centre-backs and closing down the one on the ball. Fleming supported behind her, often covering or closing down Seger, Sweden’s deepest midfielder. Canada’s wingers took up advanced positions in the channels and looked to close down their opposite full-back when they received possession.

Sweden, by contrast, sat off Canada initially. Defending in more of a 4-4-2 with a zonal focus on keeping a compact shape, Blackstenius and Asllani generally refused to press Canada’s centre-backs unless they were receiving back-passes. Blackstenius moved up more than Asllani, though both were mainly tasked with screening Canada’s double pivot.

Schmidt and Scott weren’t static, however, so they could move away from Asllani and Blackstenius to receive the ball freely from the centre-backs. One of them would stay in a central position in front of Buchanan and Zadorsky, while the other would move to the side of the centre-backs to get time and space. Rather than press up, Sweden kept their shape and only pressured Schmidt/Scott if one of them received with their back to goal centrally – Seger or Rubensson would step up to do this.

In the first half, Canada’s front four took it in turns moving into the channels on Sweden’s midfield line to receive between the lines. At times the near-side winger would move in to do this; at others Fleming or Sinclair would drop off to receive. As Sweden wanted to keep their shape, they didn’t follow these movements man-to-man, meaning Canada’s attackers were free and, if the Swedish midfield line was open enough, this allowed Canada to break the lines. However, once they had done this there was a lack of movement ahead of the ball and connections to continue the attack any further. And, in the second half, Canada started to rely almost entirely on Sinclair finding these pockets of space. This only took her away from the Sweden penalty box, where she is most effective with her hold-up play, aerial strength and finishing ability.

Another worrying aspect of Canada’s second half play was the space that kept opening up between their midfield and back four. When Sweden passed the ball out to their full-backs, Canada’s central midfielders did not stagger their positioning to cover the space between the lines. The near-side central midfielder would move up to support pressing, but the other did not cover behind her. Consequently, Sweden’s full-backs could play simple diagonal balls in to the central channel for Asllani, Blackstenius and at times Rolfo to receive, turn and drive directly at the Canadian back line. A similar problem appeared in transition – Canada looked to press the ball in this phase, but this only led to gaps opening up for Sweden to take advantage of, particularly on the left side as Canada right-back Lawrence was very attack-minded.

Trailing 0-1, Canada went direct in search of an equaliser. Labbe stepped forward and the whole team pushed up. Buchanan and Schmidt took up advanced positions alongside Sinclair to boost the team’s aerial threat in the final third to win headers and try to get a shot off afterwards. But this approach led to nothing, and Canada exited the tournament disappointingly after some bright group stage performances.