Spain 4-3-3 (Panos – Corredera, Paredes, Leon, Ouahabi – Losada, Virginia, Patri – L Garcia, Hermoso, Alexia)

USA 4-3-3 (Naeher – O’Hara, Dahlkemper, Sauerbrunn, Dunn – Lavelle, Ertz, Mewis – Heath, Morgan, Rapinoe)

Before this match, many felt Spain stood no chance against the USA due to their ineffectiveness in possession. While they dominated the ball in all of their group games, they were unable to create chances consistently and – against a solid pressing and counter-attacking team – this would likely be extremely problematic. However, Jorge Vilda changed his team’s approach to ensure a tight game that was ultimately only decided in the USA’s favour by a controversial penalty call.

Spain didn’t quite press with their usual intensity here, sitting off the USA in a 4-5-1 defensive mid-block. Despite not initially pressing the ball, their back line was still fairly high so that – if they forced the USA’s possession backwards – they were ready to move up collectively and press. They also pressed from USA goal kicks, again sitting off initially before pressing on certain triggers, such as the receiver being in a bad position. This led to their only goal, with Lucia Garcia dispossessing Sauerbrunn before Hermoso fired in.

Early on, the USA caused some problems for this defensive approach. As Spain didn’t put intense pressure on their opponent’s build-up and also didn’t have a particularly deep back line, the USA’s centre-backs had time and space to play their next pass. They also had two quick wingers in Heath and Rapinoe, who both started high and wide, to hit with diagonal balls out from the back. Once found, Heath and Rapinoe could go 1v1 against their opposite full-back and win out with their skill and speed.

The most interesting tactical aspect of this game, however, was that Spain didn’t play out themselves. For the first and only time this tournament, they had less possession than their opposition (44%). This was because they were less focused on controlling possession, and more focused on something Jose Mourinho has said is very important – giving the opponent what they don’t want.

The USA set up in their usual defensive 4-3-3, with the wingers staying on roughly the same line as Morgan and presenting a narrow front three. This setup means that if opponents, such as Spain, try to play into midfield, the receiver can be surrounded and pressured from all angles. And, if forced wide, the near-side US winger would screen the pass back inside. Spain usually try to build up using their centre-backs and central midfielders, though here they generally bypassed midfield entirely. Paredes and Leon instead played searching long balls in the USA’s centre-back/full-back channels or over the top of the USA full-backs for their wingers, Lucia Garcia and Alexia, to chase. At best, Spain’s wingers would get on the end of these passes in the final third to dribble or cross; at worst, Spain avoided playing into the USA’s pressure and removed some of their counter-attacking threat as a result.

Jill Ellis’ side like to play forward quickly in transition. With their wingers often staying high defensively, the USA are in a good position to attack the opposition last line quickly upon regaining possession, with at least two players threatening to run in behind while the other may look to make the telling pass. However, as Spain reduced the amount of times they gave the ball away in midfield with a more direct possession strategy, the USA weren’t able to kick-start their usual quick counter-attacks from the middle third.

The USA generally made use of triangles between No.8s, wingers and full-backs to progress possession, and their dynamic on the left-hand side was particularly effective. Dunn, who can play as a winger, often overlapped or took up a position inside to support progression down the left, while Rapinoe looked to cut inside and get shots off and Mewis made runs from deep in the left inside channel. But their possession was, all in all, not so penetrative against a Spain team that weren’t interested in leaving themselves exposed at the back.

An injury to Losada saw Spain modify their system slightly in the first half, with Nahikari Garcia coming on up front. Hermoso played behind her, and Spain switched from 4-3-3 to 4-2-3-1. Hermoso’s new position allowed her to roam more freely, and she often took up effective positions in transition, roaming laterally to make herself available to receive the ball and progress the attack. However, Spain stuck by their direct strategy for the most part and while this made them less vulnerable defensively, it also made them less productive offensively. They adapted intelligently and didn’t necessarily deserve to lose, but they also didn’t do enough to win.