USA 4-3-3 (Naeher – O’Hara, Dahlkemper, Sauerbrunn, Dunn – Lavelle, Horan, Mewis – Heath, Morgan, Rapinoe)

Sweden 4-4-1-1 (Lindahl – Bjorn, Ilestedt, Sembrandt, Andersson – Jakobsson, Zigiotti, Seger, Schough – Asllani – Blackstenius)

Sweden kept the same basic shape they used in their first two games, though they had less ball possession and had to do a lot more defending against the USA than was the case against Chile or Thailand. They defended in a 4-4-2 and looked to press high, with Asllani initially covering the USA’s deepest midfielder Horan before stepping up to press Sauerbrunn. Meanwhile, the central midfielders both stepped up to press their US counterparts when they dropped to receive the ball.

While this strategy succeeded in limiting the USA in their build-up, taking away the room for Horan, Mewis and Lavelle to turn when they received the ball, it didn’t stop the USA from retaining possession. This was down to the touch and intelligence of their midfield three, who were all comfortable under direct pressure and at times combined well. If Asllani did step up to press Sauerbrunn, the USA had a 3v2 in central midfield which they occasionally used to play out of pressure.

If the US could draw out and play through Sweden’s high pressure, usually with some good blind side movement and combinations between their midfield trio, they then looked to switch play out to the wings. Heath stayed high and wide on the right, making herself an easy outlet for these switches. From there she would look to run at her opposite full-back 1v1 and commit her while her teammates supported from deep.

Sometimes the USA would be forced into being more direct and play long passes from back to front, such as the intensity and organisation of Swedish high pressing. In these circumstances, they were well-placed to win at the break down of play. Their players are generally quick, physically strong and aggressive, and so were often first to loose balls, won 50/50s and applied pressure in transition to win the ball back immediately.

While the US scrapped for everything and played quickly through the thirds at every opportunity, be it in organised possession or on the counter, Sweden were slow to make the final pass. They actually got into the final third well on a number of occasions – sometimes through their pressing, sometimes through build-up – but they too often failed to play the killer ball that was needed around or through the US back line to Jakobsson or Blackstenius.