Chile 4-5-1 (Endler – Galaz, Guerrero, Saez, Toro – Zamora, Aedo, Araya, Lara, Balmaceda – Urrutia)

Sweden 4-2-3-1 (Lindahl – Glas, Fischer, Sembrandt, Eriksson – Rubensson, Seger – Jakobsson, Asllani, Rolfo – Blackstenius)

There hasn’t been a physical difference quite as noticeable as was seen in Chile’s defeat to Sweden. The size disparity between the two sides was noticeable and had an impact on the tactical approaches of both teams in different ways.

Sweden started the game brightly, attacking at a high tempo and looking to play forward and break the lines at every opportunity. Not only was their possession highly vertical, but their front three were always looking to make runs or dribbles beyond or around Chile’s defensive line. Blackstenius looked to attack the penalty box, while Rolfo and Jakobsson would get around the outside of the Chile full-backs and played driven crosses for her to get on the end of.

Chile defended in a 4-5-1 shape with a man-oriented approach that saw one player leave the midfield line to press the ball when the opponent in their zone got possession. However, their efforts were foiled by Sweden’s superior physicality – even when they could get close and pressure their opponent, Chile’s players were out-gunned 1v1 and unable to stop the Swedes from simply turning and driving beyond them.

Sweden used their physical advantages in another way – by playing crosses in the air into the Chilean penalty box for their attackers to head at goal. This was a fairly easy way for Sweden to enter the penalty box and get shots off, but they had other ways of opening up their hard-working opposition.

Their build-up structure was different to anything else seen in the tournament so far. One of their central midfielders, Seger, dropped deep in the inside left channel, while the other, Rubensson, pushed on and looked to get between Chile’s defence and midfield lines. Fischer, the right-sided centre-back, pushed on and joined the same line as Seger, while both full-backs pushed high down the flanks and the wingers came into the inside channels. At times, their attacking shape was almost a 3-6-1.

This structure was used by the Swedes to draw out Chile’s No.8s. As Chile were man-oriented in their pressing, one of Aedo or Lara would leave the midfield line to pressure the ball whenever Seger or Fischer, respectively, had possession. This created a gap in the Chilean midfield line that could be played through, which Rubensson and Asllani often looked to receive in. From here, one of the Swedish attacking midfielders could directly attack Chile’s last line with options both inside and outside to play through or around the opposition back four.

Chile tried their best, and were not short on pluck whenever they did regain the ball. Without real pace or a target player to utilise on counter-attacks, they instead focused on shooting from long range. One of these efforts almost went in, and in general it was a good way of them troubling Swedish goalkeeper Lindahl without leaving themselves open to a physically superior opponent in defensive transition. But, once they went 0-1 down, Chile lacked ideas. They played long and looked to pick up second balls off of the Swedish centre-backs’ headers, but they were unable to get back into the match.