France 4-2-3-1 (Bouhaddi – Torrent, Mbock, Renard, Majri – Bussaglia, Henry – Cascarino, Thiney, Le Sommer – Diani).

South Korea 4-4-1-1 (Kim – Kim, Hwang, Kim, Jang – Kang, Lee, Cho, Lee – Ji – Jung)

Tournament hosts France dominated this opening game. Ultimately, they had 66% of possession, 21 shots and eight shots on target. By contrast, South Korea had 34% of possession, four shots, and zero shots on target.

France attacked with two very advanced full-backs, with Torrent and Majri both pushing high down their flanks. This allowed the wingers, Cascarino and Le Sommer, to drift into the central and inside channels. This dynamic in the wider areas caused problems for Korea’s man-marking full-backs, particularly down their right-hand side. Le Sommer roamed more than Cascarino, who preferred to stay closer to the touchline. When Le Sommer drifted in, she took her marker with her and opened the left flank for Majri – an excellent dribbler – to run into and potentially receive the ball with the freedom to whip in a cross unobstructed.

The full-backs’ forward movements were enabled by the double pivot of Bussaglia and Henry, who took it in turns to stay reasonably close to the centre-backs and ensure coverage in defensive transition. One would drop to receive from the centre-backs, which was an extremely easy way to play around Korea’s first line of defence. From there, Bussaglia or Henry would look to play wide towards the full-backs and wingers, who interchanged positions and combined through one-twos to create crossing opportunities or work their way inside.

South Korea generally defended in a 4-4-2 shape and looked to press around the halfway line, though they struggled to get pressure on the ball. Ji and Jung weren’t always together on the same line, so couldn’t always press in tandem. They were also comfortably out-numbered by France’s two centre-backs and two central midfielders, meaning they were easily played around. Once this happened, there was a dilemma for the Korean wingers. They had to choose between dropping very deep and tracking the advancing Torrent or Majri, or moving up to pressure the ball-playing French central midfielder (Henry or Bussaglia). If they dropped deep, they were further from goal for counter-attacks and the French midfielders had more time to drive forward or pick a pass; if they pushed up, their full-backs were overloaded 1v2.

Defensively, France took up a 4-4-2 mid-block. The front two, Diani and Thiney, didn’t consistently press the Korean centre-backs, instead sitting off, blocking the centre and engaging if a centre-back drove forward. Behind them, both Henry and Bussaglia were quick to move up and close down any Korean midfielders that got on the ball, taking away their time and ensuring they couldn’t turn and face the French goal. If and when Korean build-up went wide to the full-backs, France shifted to the ball-side collectively and got a lot of pressure on the area around the ball. The nearest winger, forward, central midfielder and full-back would all step up or across, meaning South Korea were often overloaded near the touchline.

One noticeable aspect of France’s play came at attacking corner kicks. Renard is the tallest player at the tournament, and she was a serious aerial threat from these situations. To exploit this, France would direct floated balls (not curling in-swingers or out-swingers) in the air towards her that she was guaranteed to win. She could either head at goal directly, or head towards another area of the penalty box for a teammate to attack. This was a simple but effective way of utilising her physique, and it led to two goals on the night.